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After the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 and the fall of president Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 
1998, rural and urban Indonesia experienced a surge in vigilante killings and the rise of non-state 
forms of authorities working within the twilight of legality and illegality, assuming the role of the 
state. Institutional uncertainty, large-scale decentralisation reforms and the deterioration of formal 
legal authority in post-New Order Indonesia encouraged these processes. This apparent ‘lawlessness’ 
became especially evident along the fringes of the Indonesian state where state authority has con-
tinuously been contested and in a state of ﬂ  ux. This paper argues that observing these processes of 
lawlessness and vigilantism from the borderlands provides us with an exceptional window to under-
stand the ambiguous relationship between law and order in post-New Order Indonesia.
Keywords: Vigilantism; Illegality; Borderlands; Kalimantan; Indonesia
Nach der Asienkrise 1997 und dem Sturz des autoritären Regimes Präsident Suhartos 1998 waren 
sowohl in den ländlichen Regionen Indonesiens als auch in den Städten eine Zunahme an Bürger-
wehrmorden und ein Anwachsen nicht-staatlicher Behörden zu beobachten. Zwischen Legalität und 
Illegalität übernahmen sie vielfach die Rolle des Staates. Institutionelle Unsicherheiten, groß angeleg-
te Dezentralisierungsreformen und die Verschlechterung der formellen Rechtssprechung förderten 
nach dem Ende der „Neuen Ordnung“ diese Prozesse. Diese scheinbare Gesetzlosigkeit wurde beson-
ders in den Grenzregionen des indonesischen Staates deutlich, wo die staatliche Autorität permanent 
in Frage gestellt wird und umstritten bleibt. In diesem Artikel argumentiere ich, dass die Beobach-
tung dieser „Gesetzlosigkeit“ und Selbstjustiz in Grenzregionen eine außergewöhnliche Möglichkeit 
bietet, die mehrdeutige Beziehung zwischen Recht und Ordnung in Indonesien nach dem Ende der 
„Neuen Ordnung“ zu verstehen.
Schlagworte: Selbstjustiz; Illegalität; Grenzregionen; Kalimantan; Indonesien
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Introduction2
For those living in the borderland, it is a zone unto itself, neither wholly subject to the laws of states nor 
completely independent of them (Abraham, 2006, p. 4).
Borderlands have long been the sites of violence, the consequence either of govern-
ment incapacity or disinterest in marginal regions, or of occasional attempts by sta-
tes to assert control over ‘recalcitrant’ border peoples. Borderland lawlessness, or 
the ambiguous space between state laws, often provides fertile ground for activities 
deemed illicit by one or both states – for example smuggling and tax-evasion (Taglia-
cozzo, 2002; 2005). Border space may also allow the growth of local leadership built 
on those illegal activities and maintained through patronage and violence (McCoy, 
1999; Sturgeon, 2005; Walker, 1999). In such situations, border peoples often enjoy 
a fair measure of autonomy from state interference, which may further complica-
te their already ambiguous relations with either state (Martínez, 1994a). This paper 
examines issues of lawlessness and autonomy in Indonesia along the stretch of the 
West Kalimantan borderland inhabited by the ethnic Iban, focusing on incidents of 
vigilantism and gangsterism, and how the ambiguity and separateness engendered 
by the border promote and enhance these practices. 
Vigilantism here refers to the taking of or advocating the taking of the law into 
one’s own hands (that is, the circumvention of established channels of law enforce-
ment and justice) in the face of the apparent failure of state authorities to deal ef-
fectively with criminal matters. According to Abrahams, acts of vigilantism often 
appear in ‘frontier zones’ and here constitute a criticism of ineffectual and corrupt 
state institutions (Abrahams, 1998, pp. 1-9). While organised vigilante groups seem 
to have been on the rise throughout Indonesia since the late 1990s, as a result of the 
Indonesian state’s inability to tackle crime, such acts of vigilantism often come with 
state recognition and are integrated into the broader state apparatus of surveillance 
and social control (Barker, 2007). Most of these vigilante groups are to an extent 
legitimated by state authorities, either by assuming the role of informal neighbour-
hood policing units or by serving as tools of political manipulation of religious and 
2  This paper is a revised version of an article co-authored with Reed Lee Wadley and first published in the Kyoto 
Review of Southeast Asia (Wadley & Eilenberg, 2006).ASEAS 4(2)
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nationalist sentiments for economic or ideological gain, often with implicit police ap-
proval. Vigilante groups in Indonesia have multiple underlying motivations that rely 
on moral rectitude based on ethnicity, class, and religious affiliation (Wilson, 2006). 
Vigilante groups are also widely used in conflict areas as paramilitary units (see East 
Timor, Maluku, Papua) (Coppel, 2005; Hedman, 2008; Thorning, 2005; Wilson, 2010).
However, as I will elaborate on below, acts of vigilantism are not necessarily re-
cognised by the state but instead viewed as disorderly and illicit acts that challenge 
state authority. Along the fringes of the Indonesian state, where state authority is 
especially weak, local moral codexes and norms have long collided with formal legal 
standards resulting in acts of vigilantism. Reinforced by the fragmentation of state 
authority, such self-help efforts frequently resulted in extra-judicial violence and exe-
cutions of suspected criminals in the remote borderlands of Indonesia during the 
first decade following the regime shift in 1998.
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Historical heredity
Persons who find it politic to hurriedly shift from one side of the border to the other can hardly be con-
sidered as valuable citizens of either State.3
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, with their efforts to suppress cross-border 
headhunting and define colonial citizenship, British and Dutch colonial authorities 
on Borneo partitioned the Kalimantan Iban from the larger population in Sarawak, 
Malaysia. The Iban borderland was often the focus of contentious inter-colonial rela-
tions, and the Iban did their best to take advantage of differing terms and conditions 
that colonial rule offered on either side; for example, by using the border to escape 
taxes and resist colonial authority (Wadley, 2004). The independence of Indonesia 
and the formation of the Malaysian federation in the mid-twentieth century only 
furthered the partition, particularly under the heavy militarisation along the border 
during confrontation in the early 1960s and the subsequent Communist insurgency 
into the 1970s (Eilenberg, 2011). It was not as if this cut off border populations or the 
rest of the province from the other side; on the contrary, cross-border flows continu-
ed largely as they had for decades. However, the building of a road network along the 
border in the 1980s to 1990s facilitated an increased flow of people and goods – legal 
and illegal – back and forth across the border (Wadley, 1998). 
Nonetheless, along with the remoteness of the region from Indonesian centres, 
the economic disparities between Indonesia and Malaysia that developed during this 
period kept the Kalimantan Iban economically oriented toward Malaysia, reinforced 
by their cultural and historical roots in Sarawak. The Asian economic crisis of 1997 
and the dramatic political changes it spurred in Indonesia, including de-militarisation 
of the border, have only intensified this orientation (Fariastuti, 2002; Riwanto, 2002; 
Siburian, 2002). The Iban position on the borderland, adjacent to a more prosperous 
and politically stable neighbour, has meant that their interests lie partly across the 
border, where they find temporary employment and occasionally immigrate to per-
manently (Eilenberg & Wadley, 2009). As part of the fallout of the central Indonesian 
government’s loss of power, the on-going boom in ‘illegal’ logging has also figured 
3  Quote from Sarawak Gazette (1 October 1895) in Report from Assitant Resident Burgdorffer, 2 December 1914, 
Verbaal 20 Augustus 1915 No. 41, Politieke Verslagen en Berichten uit de Buitengewesten van Nederlands-Indië (1898-
1940), Ministerie van Koloniën, Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, Netherlands [hereafter ARA].ASEAS 4(2)
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into a mixed, local economic strategy. Yet a critical element in this boom has been 
the presence of Malaysian Chinese timber entrepreneurs with their local sawmills, 
logging operations, and Malaysian Iban workers (Wadley & Eilenberg, 2005).
However, the term ‘illegal’ poses a semantic problem. Especially when understood 
from the point of view of borderlanders, it glosses too easily over a complex picture 
(Schendel & Abraham, 2005). ‘Illegal’ implies a sense of wrongdoing, which may be 
quite adequate for state-level concerns, but it does not necessarily “represent the 
ways in which border residents proudly stake their economic claim in transborder 
trade movement” (Flynn, 1997, p. 324). On the contrary, although aware of being in-
volved in something defined by distant politicians as illicit, borderlanders may feel 
no moral wrongdoing and regard such laws as unjust and unreasonable (Schendel, 
2006). Thus, what is illegal as defined by state law is usually straightforward for 
agents of the state (though they too may circumvent their own laws), while border-
landers may more routinely engage state regulation with flexibility, not feeling as 
beholden to adhere to laws they see as imposed from the outside and against their 
interests (Schendel, 2006). This is most clearly seen in logging operations in the bor-
derland since 1998 – deemed illegal by the state but legitimate by local communities 
now back in control of their traditional forests.
Case 1: Vigilantes
The border area is faced with many problems; in order to deal effectively with these problems I was 
elected as local judge in settling these local matters. People here do not trust the police and government 
judges. They believe in customary rule (hukum adat) (temenggong4 in Lanjak, personal communication, 
25 March 2007).
The above quote clearly illustrates local suspicion towards external legal authorities, 
a suspicion that more often than not leads to the internal resolution of local dispu-
tes. State law is only recognised to the extent that it is considered to fit local norms 
of fairness and justice. As I will describe in the case below, when state law and local 
norms collide, local communities are not slow to actively resist encroachment upon 
their legal orders.
4  The temenggong is a Dayak tribal-head/adat leader.
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In early December 2000, a courtroom in Putussibau, the district capital of Kapuas 
Hulu, became the scene of murder as a group of around 300-400 men, armed with 
shotguns and bush knives, avenged the death of their kinsman.5 The victim, a Malay 
man named Usnata, was on trial for the January 2000 murder of an Iban moneychan-
ger named Sandak. The courtroom killing hit the national press as the first vigilante 
killing  inside  an  Indonesian  courthouse.  Then-president  Abdurahman  Wahid  met 
with the victim’s family, and provincial officials promised to bring the perpetrators 
to justice (“400 Massa bersenjata”, 2000; “Keluarga Usnata lapor”, 2000; “Malaysia 
belum tanggapi”, 2000). Yet in the following months and years, the incident fell ‘off 
the radar’ of local and national authorities, and no one of the several hundred who 
participated has ever been, nor will likely be, charged in the murder.
At its surface, this appears to be another case of amuk massa, the seemingly spon-
taneous killing of people accused of petty crime in the context of an ineffectual justi-
ce system (Colombijn, 2002). But its underlying structure and motivation, something 
not addressed in the press, reveals the interplay of borderland identity, diminished 
state power, and official corruption.6 Sandak, the Iban moneychanger, was in fact 
related by marriage to Usnata, the latter having married Sandak’s cousin. It was 
understandable then that Sandak, his bag filled with 70 million rupiah from his trans-
actions on the border, would board a speedboat with Usnata. On the long journey 
to the bank, Usnata and the driver, a Padang man named Edi, apparently killed Sand-
ak and dumped his body overboard. It was only after several months that Sandak’s 
body was discovered, and the police began to suspect Usnata (Edi having fled the 
province): not only was he one of the last people seen with Sandak, but he had also 
purchased expensive consumer goods after Sandak disappeared. 
Sandak’s Iban kin demanded that Usnata pay pati nyawa or blood money in accor-
dance with Iban customary law (adat). He refused, and so the case was passed to the 
district court for trial. After the first day of the trial, the Iban decided that Usnata 
would likely be acquitted as they suspected he had bribed the presiding judge, and 
so they organised the attack, drawing Iban connected to Sandak from both sides of 
the border. Part of their rationale, besides revenge, was that the court was corrupt 
5  The police, who had been on hand to prevent the rumoured attack, were out-numbered and hence retreated. They 
later negotiated with the vigilantes after the killing and persuaded them not to cut off the victim’s head.
6  The following account comes from correspondence with local Iban who were not involved in the incident.ASEAS 4(2)
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and justice from the government unattainable; they were also incensed that Usnata 
had refused to adhere to Iban adat. Indeed, had he paid the pati nyawa, Usnata would 
probably still be alive.
Thus, though stemming from common perceptions of an ineffectual and corrupt 
criminal justice system, this vigilante killing is far different from the usual amuk 
massa killings in places like Java, which occur almost spontaneously when someone 
identifies a thief or similar petty criminal on the street or marketplace; amuk massa 
killings are rapid and immediate following identification and accusation. In contrast, 
Usnata’s killing was planned and organised over several days, involved a force of 
men mobilised from a wide social and geographical network, occurred in a court of 
justice which is unique to vigilante killings in Indonesia, and involved direct but non-
violent confrontation with police.
Case 2: Gangsters
In January 2005, a team of 26 government officials7 and one television journalist were 
investigating illegal logging in the vicinity of the Betung Kerihun National Park on the 
Indonesian side of the border (“Kail sesali pembiaran”, 2005; “Wartawan TV5”, 2005). 
Six weeks prior to this, police had arrested three Malaysian Chinese involved in cross-
border logging and confiscated both equipment and timber (“Empat warga Malaysia”, 
2004), though the ‘ringleader’, a Malaysian Chinese timber boss named Apeng (“Tang-
kap Apeng”, 2004; “Tangkap Apheng”, 2004), had escaped. The new team set out with 
the hopes of apprehending Apeng but found that their Kijang vehicles could not ne-
gotiate the bad roads. So, they commandeered Toyota Land Cruisers (with Malaysian 
license plates) that were among the equipment confiscated earlier.
After the team had stopped to make camp for the night, two pick-ups with Malay-
sian license plates and carrying around 20 armed men approached. The leader of the 
group, a local Iban man, began to interrogate the team, apparently unintimidated by 
its police and military members. Upon discovering the team’s purpose and its use of 
confiscated vehicles, the man grew angry and blamed them for the loss of local jobs. 
He ordered his men to seize the vehicles in order to leave the team on foot. But in 
7  These officials included district forest rangers, prosecutors, police, and military personnel, some of them well-
armed.
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a curious twist, the team negotiated transport to the local subdistrict police head-
quarters in Lanjak, to which the local group agreed. Upon arrival in Lanjak, the locals 
refused to return the vehicles and fled with them across the border to Malaysia.
The journalist was dumbfounded by the inability or unwillingness of the police 
and army to intervene; he reported that the security force members of the team had 
agreed with the Iban leader not to step in, perhaps to avoid further conflict with lo-
cal communities. Indeed, district officials later told him that the incident was a local 
matter, with no need to involve outside parties and that there was no need to make 
it public. Meanwhile, the provincial coordinator of Kail Kalbar (an anti-illegal logging 
consortium) expressed his lack of understanding of how locals could be more loyal 
and cooperative to a foreigner (Apeng) than to their own government. He suggested 
that the provincial police would have to take over from the district police if the latter 
were unable to perform their proper duties.
Perhaps the Kail Kalbar coordinator had ‘inside knowledge’, because within two 
months, provincial and national police launched Operasi Hutan Lestari, resulting in 
the arrest of several Malaysians and Indonesians (Chinese, Iban, and Malays) involved 
in cross-border logging. The operation also placed a ban on transporting already cut 
timber across the border, a move that upset locals who had derived income from the 
trade. They sent a large delegation (around 200 people) to the district capital, Putus-
sibau, to promote a lifting of the ban, arguing that the timber came from community 
forests (hutan adat) and that Indonesian markets were prohibitively distant. To date, 
there has been no resolution; the border towns that had boomed from the cross-bor-
der flow of people and goods have become ghost towns. The Indonesian Minister of 
Forestry, M. S. Kaban, has said that local communities have no legal basis to permit 
commercial timber cutting (“Masyarakat Kapuas”, 2005; “Masyarakat perbatasan”, 
2005; “Warga protes”, 2005).
Vigilantes and Gangsters in Wider Perspective
These two cases illustrate important processes of borderland life that must be un-
derstood in order to address the economic and social problems facing the border 
area in general. But the principal motivations of these instances of ‘people’s justice’ 
are embedded in a long history of legal autonomy as a consequence of weak state ASEAS 4(2)
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authority in the borderland. 
The Kalimantan Iban have become accustomed to considerable autonomy in dea-
ling with local civil and criminal matters and have not been bashful in challenging at-
tempts to reduce that autonomy. A late nineteenth-century Dutch official referred to 
them as een levendig en strijdlustig volk (a lively and pugnacious people),8 and though 
we should be cautious about an essentialised perspective such as this, it does speak 
to a certain cultural vitality and confidence that has been fostered, in no small part 
by the unique relationship the Iban on both sides of the border have crafted with the 
state over the past century and a half. It is no accident that the Iban-inhabited stretch 
of the border between Dutch West Borneo and British Sarawak produced the most 
continuous border tensions between the colonial powers in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries,9 because the Iban were so difficult to contain and pacify (Kater, 
1883; Niclou, 1887).
Even after formal pacification in 1886, the colonial governments treated the Iban 
with caution in order not to antagonise them. For example, on both sides of the bor-
der, Iban paid less in taxes than other native peoples – in Sarawak, because they were 
obligated to serve on government expeditions, and in Dutch West Borneo, probably 
to keep things equivalent with Sarawak practice.10 In addition, the system of Dutch-
appointed leaders – temenggong and patih – became increasingly autonomous over 
time, particularly during the great political turmoil and transition of the 1940s to 
1950s. Furthermore, the Kalimantan Iban’s special affinity for Sarawak was encoura-
ged by the Sarawak government: In 1882, Charles Brooke, the second British ruler of 
Sarawak, unsuccessfully offered to take the Kalimantan Iban under his control, “even 
if a certain portion of the land adjoining the frontier where these Dyaks are located, 
were transferred to the Sarawak rule”11 – a fact that is retained within Iban historical 
narratives.
It is not surprising then to see the Kalimantan Iban asserting their interests in 
particular situations, even when it may be dangerous: During the counter-insurgency 
militarisation of the border in the 1960s to 1970s, the Iban rejected the Indonesian 
8  Letter to NI Governor-General from Resident Tromp, 10 June 1891, Openbaar Verbaal 12 June 1894 No.13, ARA.
9  Letter to NI Governor-General from Resident Tromp, 4 April 1894, Openbaar Verbaal 6 June 1895 No. 12, ARA.
10 The official reason was that Iban “earning capacity” was lower, but this makes no sense as other Dayak groups 
in the Upper Kapuas District were also poor and distant from good markets (Letter to NI Governor-General from 
Resident Tromp, 4 April 1894, Openbaar Verbaal 6 June 1895 No. 12, ARA).
11 Letter to NI Governor-General from Charles Brooke, 25 September 1882, Mailrapport 1882 No. 1066, ARA.
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military’s order to turn in their shotguns. Descending on the army headquarters in 
full ritual regalia and led by their temenggong and patih, the several-hundred-strong 
group of men said that they would turn in their guns if the army promised to post 
soldiers in their fields to protect them against marauding forest pigs and monkeys. To 
this day, the three subdistricts dominated by the Iban are the only places in Kapuas 
Hulu district, and perhaps the province of West Kalimantan, where citizens are allo-
wed to keep their shotguns at home and not registered at the local police stations 
(Eilenberg, 2012).
In light of this, and in the context of de facto governmental decentralisation, and 
demoralisation of the police and military following the fall of Suharto in 1998, the 
revenge killing of Usnata makes much more sense, and we see a number of histo-
rical continuities: The strong sense of cultural autonomy is particularly apparent, 
customary law should precede national law locally, and the forceful pursuit of Iban 
interests is deemed entirely legitimate. The ability of the Iban to mobilize rapidly also 
figures prominently and finds its historical parallel in nineteenth-century headhun-
ting expeditions that could number in the hundreds and thousands (Freeman, 1961). 
Although changes in Indonesian political life provided them additional space to ope-
rate after 1998, the Iban involved in the Usnata incident would not have been able or 
willing to engage in it without the benefit of these historically precedent qualities.
With regard to the case of gangsterism, three additional factors have been at 
work. First, as a result of national decentralisation processes, district governments 
throughout Indonesia have had more power than they ever had. Second, Kapuas Hulu 
district officials have seen cross-border logging as a good opportunity to develop the 
borderland economy, which had been long neglected by the central government (Ei-
lenberg, 2009). Third, many local Iban (along with some district officials) did and still 
do not share central and provincial government views on the legality of current log-
ging activities, and they see the interference of ‘outsiders’, such as the government 
operation described above, as a breach of local autonomy. The passivity of the local 
district police and military can be seen then as a careful response to the economic 
benefits they have derived from logging and a healthy respect for the ability of local 
Iban to take action. 12
12  Local civilian, police, and military officials are, by and large, not ‘locals’ themselves but come from a variety 
of places – elsewhere in the province or well beyond, such as Java and Bali. Given the link between cross-border 
activities and illegality, it is difficult to assess how or if local officials are involved beyond simply facilitating and ASEAS 4(2)
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Following the fall of the New Order government in 1998, Malaysian Chinese timber 
entrepreneurs crossed the long and porous border into West Kalimantan in order 
to set up local logging operations. They have routinely co-operated with local com-
munities in need of income and with unofficial approval of district governments. In 
addition to the economically and politically conducive climate and an international 
demand for tropical timber, easy access across the border through an improved road 
network (originally justified by national security concerns) has facilitated such ope-
rations. For their part, local communities have viewed the forested areas along the 
border as their own traditional managed forest, and the harvest of that timber as the 
result of locally negotiated agreements.13 To make their businesses run smoothly, the 
timber entrepreneurs have bribed important district and subdistrict officials, inclu-
ding police, military, and immigration agents at the border, a fact widely known by 
local borderlanders.
In the Kapuas Hulu District, such processes involving Malaysian entrepreneurs 
(known locally as tukei) and local Iban have been widely in play. As a consequence of 
their long cultural and economic affinity with Sarawak and having been long margi-
nalised by their own central and provincial governments, many Iban borderlanders 
have a weak sense of commitment to their own state (Wadley & Eilenberg, 2005). 
They have seen no dilemma in cooperating with the more familiar Malaysian tukei14 
(and their Malaysian Iban employees), who know much more about Iban customs and 
language than Indonesian government officials. Local Iban have thus felt comfortable 
dealing with the tukei and their cross-border cousins. In addition, because the Kali-
mantan Iban have long engaged in wage labour across the border while their Sara-
wak kin have felt no similar pull from Kalimantan, these activities have introduced a 
new set of connections among the partitioned Iban, strengthening the long tradition 
of cross-border ethnic relations (Eilenberg & Wadley, 2009).
In the years following the initial onset of cross-border logging, the provincial and 
national press reported only sporadically about these undertakings in the remote 
Kapuas Hulu (Bider, 2003; “Illegal logging”, 2003; “Mafia illegal logging”, 2003; Ranik, 
collecting fees on such activities on their side of the border.
13  Although communities have been divided on the question of timber harvesting and cooperation with Malaysian 
timber bosses, most communities were initially happy with the arrangement, although tensions have risen as the 
side-effects of logging have appeared, such as water pollution (“Warga perbatasan”, 2004).
14  Prior to their operations in West Kalimantan, the Malaysian tukei operated for decades in Sarawak Iban areas and 
preferentially hired local Iban, having learned to trust their honesty and work ethic.  
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2002). But later, as the volume of cross-border smuggling increased and the loss of 
resources and state revenue became too high to ignore, media attention was once 
more directed towards the remote border area.15 The theme then became the Ma-
laysian exploitation of West Kalimantan resources, with provocative headlines such 
as “Malaysia eats our fruit, while Indonesia swallows the sap” (“Lika-liku praktik”, 
2003) and “When will Malaysian ‘colonization’ of the Kalbar border end?” (“Kapan 
‘penjajahan’ Malaysia”, 2004). The stronger nationalist tone to these later reports 
also included an explicit criminalisation of cross-border activities: The tukei and their 
Malaysian workers were now seen as gangsters armed with guns, intimidating local 
communities, with ‘Gengster Cina Malaysia’ becoming the buzz phrase (“Belum ada 
fakta”, 2004; “‘Gangster’ bersenjata”, 2004).
As a consequence of this change, national and provincial politicians demanded 
that district officials take prompt action. Despite district government assurances 
on dealing with these ‘Malaysian gangsters’, early attempts to crack down on illegal 
logging in the border area were few and half-hearted, and the people arrested were 
mostly “small fry” (“Cukong kayu illegal”, 2003; “Operasi Wanalaga II”, 2003), especial-
ly as district officials were in no hurry to end the lucrative cross-border connections. 
It seemed that the ‘gangsters’ would continue their activities unabated, supported by 
district officials and local communities (“Dukung Kapolda”, 2004; “Pengiriman kayu 
illegal”, 2004). Operasi Hutan Lestari, however, altered the previous state of affairs. 
Indeed, what we now see is a national and provincial attempt to wrest control of 
revenue streams from the districts and domesticate the ‘unruly’ and ‘defiant’ border-
lands and their inhabitants (Eilenberg, 2012). 
Conclusion
Located on the fringes of the Indonesian state and in close proximity to a neighbou-
ring state with which they have long maintained cultural and economic relations, 
the feeling of being different is predominant among West Kalimantan Iban – a sense 
of separateness and otherness from the heartland and its population, economically, 
culturally, and historically. In addition, one of the general characteristics that per-
15  Several incidents over the last several years of border transgressing have also served to keep things ‘hot’ in the 
media as well as diplomatically (“Malaysia belum tanggapi”, 2000; “Sengketa perbatasan”, 2000).ASEAS 4(2)
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meate Iban borderlander life is the feeling of being pulled in several directions at 
once, but the strength of the pull depends on the degree of interaction and relations 
on both sides (Martínez, 1994b). Indeed, the borderlanders with the weakest loyalty 
to their own national state are often those with the strongest cross-border ties. Poli-
tically, the Kalimantan Iban belong to a state that demands their unswerving loyalty 
but ethnically, emotionally, and economically, they often feel part of another, non-
state entity (Baud & Schendel, 1997), the bulk of which is located in another state. 
For many Iban, the connections across the border remain stronger than those with 
their own nation state, resulting in a weak sense of national belonging or identity 
(Lumenta, 2005). 
Often, border populations maintain cross-border economic links although they 
may subvert national law; in many cases, they have little other choice because their 
national governments have failed to integrate the borderland into the larger national 
economy (Driessen, 1999). Borderlanders thus exhibit a tendency to bend, ignore, and 
breach laws that they see as interfering with their interests and special way of life. 
Rigid laws governing international borders that restrict cross-border interaction may 
lead to diverse conflict and rule bending (Abraham, 2006). Furthermore, the sense of 
otherness towards the state as experienced by borderlanders is increased because 
their interests often diverge from and conflict with national interests. Seeing them-
selves as being marginal to a larger national unity, many Iban often feel that the 
distant political centre does not understand the special circumstances of living in a 
borderland. 
Its ambiguous nature of both uniting and dividing characterises the special envi-
ronment of the border. By its very nature in dividing two separate states with their 
often different administrative and regulatory regimes, the border thus may generate 
an ‘opportunity structure’ for activities, such as smuggling and immigration that 
both states deem illicit (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999). Smuggling and illicit trade is of-
ten described as “the borderland occupation par excellence” (Rösler & Wendl, 1999, 
p. 13). For example, Wilson and Donnan (1999) note how international borders can be 
both ‘used’ (trade) and ‘abused’ (smuggling). On the one hand, borders bring econo-
mic opportunity and generate a two-way flow of goods and people, but on the other 
hand they facilitate economic gain through illegal import and export, such as we 
have seen with the smuggling of timber from West Kalimantan. Such illicit processes 
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form “the subversive economy of borderlands” (Wilson & Donnan, 1998, p. 87), often 
highly important for the livelihoods of many borderlanders and sometimes the most 
important economic force in the border region. 
Yet this typical ‘borderland’ scenario presents us with only part of the picture 
with regard to the Iban borderland, as it cannot be fully understood without refe-
rence to the special affinity West Kalimantan Iban have developed for Sarawak. Not 
only are they a minority group within their own province, partitioned from a much 
larger population in a visibly more prosperous country across the border, they have 
also received special treatment by successive colonial and national governments on 
both sides of the border. This has allowed them considerable space to develop a 
strong sense of autonomy, heightening the sense of separateness that appears ubi-
quitous with borderlands. Under the circumstances following the Asian Economic 
Crisis of 1997 and the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, it is perhaps not surprising to 
see events turn out as they have, given this critically important historical precedent.
References
Note from the author: Not all newspaper articles listed here are available online. For Antara News Agency, 
Equator News, Kompas, Media Indonesia, Pontianak Post, Sinar Harapan and Suara Pembaruan, the online 
links to the articles no longer work. I hold copies on file.
400 Massa bersenjata serang PN Kapuas Hulu. (2000, 14 December). Pontianak Post Online.
Abraham, I. (2006). Illegal but licit. International Institute for Asian Studies, IIAS Newsletter, 42, 1-4.
Abrahams, R. (1998). Vigilant citizens: Vigilantism and the state. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
Anderson, J., & O’Dowd, L. (1999). Borders, border regions and territoriality: Contradictory meanings, 
changing significance. Regional Studies, 33(7), 593-604.
Barker, J. (2007). Vigilantes and the state. In T. Day (Ed.), Identifying with freedom: Indonesia after Suharto 
(pp. 87-94). New York, NY: Berghahn.
Baud, M., & Schendel, W. v. (1997). Toward a comparative history of borderlands. Journal of World Hi-
story, 8(2), 211-242.
Belum ada fakta gangster Malaysia kuasai perbatasan. (2004, 25 April). Media Indonesia Online.
Bider, B. (2003, 18 March). West Kalimantan unable to halt illegal logging. Jakarta Post Online. Last re-
trieved on 13 November 2011, from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2003/03/18/west-kalimantan-
unable-halt-illegal-logging.htmlASEAS 4(2)
250 251
Colombijn, F. (2002). Maling, maling! The lynching of petty criminals. In F. Colombijn & J. T. Lindblad 
(Eds.), Roots of violence in Indonesia (pp. 299-329). Leiden, the Netherlands: KITLV Press.
Coppel, C. A. (2005). Violent conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, representation, resolution. London, England 
& New York, NY: Routledge.
Cukong kayu illegal asal Malaysia belum tertangkap. (2003, 23 July). Kompas Online.
Driessen, H. (1999). Smuggling as a border way of life: A mediterranean case. In M. Rösler & T. Wendl 
(Eds.), Frontiers and Borderlands: Anthropological perspectives. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang.
Dukung Kapolda tuntaskan illegal logging. (2004, 11 August). Kompas Online. 
Eilenberg, M. (2009). Negotiating autonomy at the margins of the state: The dynamics of elite politics 
in the borderland of West Kalimantan, Indonesia. South East Asia Research, 17(2), 201-227.
Eilenberg, M. (2011). Straddling the Border: A Marginal History of Guerrilla Warfare and ‘Counter-
Insurgency’ in the Indonesian Borderlands. Modern Asian Studies, 45(6), 1423-1463.
Eilenberg, M. (2012). At the edges of states: Dynamics of state formation in the Indonesian borderlands. 
Leiden, the Netherlands: KITLV Press.
Eilenberg, M., & Wadley, R. L. (2009). Borderland livelihood strategies: The socio-economic significance 
of ethnicity in cross-border labour migration, West Kalimantan, Indonesia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 50(1), 
58-73.
Empat warga Malaysia ditangkap terlihat pencurian kayu diperbatasan. (2004, 11 March). Kompas On-
line. 
Fariastuti. (2002). Mobility of people and goods across the border of West Kalimantan and Sarawak. 
Antropologi Indonesia, 67, 94-104.
Flynn, D. K. (1997). “We are the border”: Identity, exchange, and the state along the Benin-Nigeria bor-
der. American Ethnologist, 24(2), 311-330.
Freeman, J. D. (1961). On the Concept of the Kindred. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 
91, 192-220.
“Gangster” bersenjata Malaysia dilarporkan kuasai perbatasan. (2004, 22 April). Sinar Harapan Online. 
Hedman, E.-L. E. (2008). Conflict, violence, and displacement in indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Pro-
gram, Cornell University.
Ilegal logging libatkan mafia internasional dan Oknum pejabat. (2003, 19 June). Pontianak Post Online.
Kail sesali pembiaran perampasan mobil bukti “illegal logging”. (2005, 15 January). Antara News Agency.
Kapan “penjajahan” Malaysia di perbatasan Kalbar berakhir? (2004, 22 December). Suara Pembaruan 
Online.
Kater, C. (1883). Iets over de Batang Loepar Dajakhs in de ’Westerafdeeling van Borneo’. De Indische 
Gids, 5, 1-14.
Keluarga Usnata lapor ke presiden. (2000, 19 December) Pontianak Post Online.
Michael Eilenberg - Flouting the LawASEAS 4(2)
252 253
Lika-liku praktik illegal logging di Kalbar: Malaysia makan buahnya, Indonesian telan getahnya. (2003, 
9 May). Suara Pembaruan Online. 
Lumenta, D. (2005). Borderland identity construction within a market place of narrative. Preliminary 
notes on the Batang Kanyau Iban in West Kalimantan. Masyarakat Indonesia-Majalah Ilmu-Ilmu Social 
Indonesia, XXX(2), 1-26.
Mafia illegal logging, cukong atau aparat. (2003, 22 June). Pontianak Post Online. 
Malaysia belum tanggapi soal pencurian kayu. (2000, 4 July). Kompas Online. 
Martínez, O. J. (1994a). Border people: Life and society in The U.S.-Mexico borderlands. Tucson, AZ & Lon-
don, England: The University of Arizona Press.
Martínez, O. J. (1994b). The dynamics of border interaction: New approaches to border analysis. In C. 
H. Schoefield (Ed.), Global boundaries: World boundaries (Vol. 1, pp. 1-15). London, England: Routledge.
Masyarakat Kapuas minta polisi tidak segal kayu hutan adat. (2005, 29 March). Media Indonesia Online. 
Masyarakat perbatasan minta solusi illegal logging. (2005, 4 April). Pontianak Post Online.
McCoy, A. W. (1999). Requim for a drug lord: State and commodity in the career of Khun Sa. In J. M. 
Heyman (Ed.), States and Illegal Practices (pp. 129-167). Oxford, England: Berg.
Niclou, H. A. A. (1887). Batang-Loepars - Verdelging-oorlog. Europeesch-Dajaksche sneltocht. Tijdschrift 
voor Nederlandsch-Indie, 16, 29-67.
Operasi Wanalaga II tahan 116 pelaku penebangan liar. (2003, 17 June). Kompas Online. 
Pengiriman kayu illegal ke Malaysia masih terjadi. (2004, 28 July). Kompas Online. 
Ranik, E. S. (2002, 26 November). Loggers head for heart of Betung Kerihun National Park. Jakarta Post 
Online. Last retrieved on 13 November 2011, from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2002/11/26/
loggers-head-heart-betung-kerihun-park.html
Riwanto, T. (2002). West Kalimantan as ‘border area’: A political-demography perspective. Antropologi 
Indonesia, Special Issue, 1-14.
Rösler, M., & Wendl, T. (1999). Frontiers and borderlands: Anthropological perspectives. Frankfurt am 
Main, Germany: Peter Lang.
Schendel, W. v. (Ed.). (2006). Underworlds & borderlands. IIAS Newsletter 42 (Special Issue). Leiden, the 
Netherlands: IIAS.
Schendel, W. v., & Abraham, I. (Eds.). (2005). Illicit flows and criminal things: states, borders, and the other 
side of globalization. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Sengketa perbatasan yang berawal dari berebut hasil hutan. (2000, 11 September). Suara Pembaruan 
Online. 
Siburian, R. (2002). Entikong: Daerah tanpa krisis ekonomi di perbatasan Kalimantan Barat-Sarawak. 
Antropologi Indonesia, 67, 87-93.ASEAS 4(2)
252 253
Sturgeon, J. C. (2005). Border landscapes: The politics of Akha land use in China and Thailand. Seattle, WA 
& London, England: University of Washington Press.
Tagliacozzo, E. (2002). Smuggling in Southeast Asia: History and its contemporary vectors in an un-
bound region. Critical Asian Studies, 34(2), 193-220.
Tagliacozzo, E. (2005). Secret trades, porous borders: Smuggling and states along a Southeast Asian frontier, 
1865-1915. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tangkap Apeng, kenapa baru sekarang. (2004, 9 August). Equator News Online. 
Tangkap Apheng: Masyarakat masih tunggu janji Kapolda. (2004, 14 September). Equator News Online. 
Thorning, R. (2005). Civil militias: Indonesia and Nigeria in comparative perspective. In D. J. Francis 
(Ed.), Civil Militia (pp. 89-109). Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
Wadley, R. L. (1998). The road to change in the Kapuas Hulu borderlands: Jalan Lintas Utara. Borneo 
Research Bulletin, 29, 71-94.
Wadley, R. L. (2004). Punitive expeditions and divine revenge: Oral and colonial histories of rebellion 
and pacification in western Borneo, 1886-1902. Ethnohistory 51(3), 609-636.
Wadley, R. L., & Eilenberg, M. (2005). Autonomy, identity, and ‘illegal’ logging in the borderland of West 
Kalimantan, Indonesia. Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 6(1), 19-34.
Wadley, R. L., & Eilenberg, M. (2006). Vigilantes and Gangsters in the Borderland of West Kalimantan, 
Indonesia. Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. Last retrieved on 21 November 2011, from http://kyotoreview-
sea.org/Wadley_eng.htm
Walker, A. (1999). The legend of the golden boat: Regulation, trade and traders in the borderlands of Laos, 
Thailand, Burma and China. Surrey, England: Curzon Press.
Warga perbatasan diteror cukong kayu. (2004, 22 December). Suara Pembaruan Online. 
Warga protes Operasi Hutan Lestari. (2005, March 23). Kompas Online.
Wartawan TV5 dan tim olah TKP digelandang massa di Pontianak. (2005, 15 January). Kompas Online. 
Wilson, I. (2006). The Changing contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia. Critical 
Asian Studies, 38(2), 265-297.
Wilson, I. (2010). The rise and fall of political gangsters in Indonesian democracy. In E. Aspinall & M. 
Mietzner (Eds.), Problems of democratisation in Indonesia: elections, institutions, and society (pp. 199-218). 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Wilson, T. M., & Donnan, H. (1998). Border identities: Nation and state at international frontiers. Cam-
bridge, England & New York, NY: Cambridge University Press
Michael Eilenberg - Flouting the Law